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Most retrospective merger studies resort to the treatment effect approach, comparing the price 
dynamics in a treatment group and in a control group. We propose a systematic method to 
construct the groups, which applies to any industry with spatial competition. The method is 
consistent with the fact that mergers alter oligopolistic equilibria in complex ways, and thus 
that seemingly distant entities may be affected through indirect channels. An illustration 
based on a merger in the Parisian parking market is provided. 
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The demand for merger evaluation is increasing. Antitrust agencies commission retrospec-
tive studies to assess the eﬀectiveness of merger control (LLP. (2005) and Lear (2006))
and initiate in-house studies to estimate the price eﬀects of certain mergers (see for in-
stance Taylor and Hosken (2007) and Simpson and Taylor (2008) on two mergers in the
U.S. petroleum industry). Yet the supply of merger retrospectives remains low, most likely
because of data limitations, as illustrated by Taylor, Kreisle, and Zimmerman (2010) and
Hastings (2010). With a few exceptions, notably Hastings (2004), the academic literature
has focused on waves of mergers rather than on single merger events.1
The vast majority of retrospective studies resort to the treatment eﬀect methodology,
comparing price variations in a treatment group and in a control group. As a general
rule, the treatment (control) group consists of ﬁrms, outlets or geographical areas that are
supposedly aﬀected (unaﬀected) by the merger.
Drawing the line between aﬀected and unaﬀected entities is particularly diﬃcult in in-
dustries where ﬁrms compete spatially through retail outlets. Insider outlets, which were
rivals prior to the merger and are operated by the same entity after the merger, have
less incentives to compete. Beyond this direct eﬀect, however, mergers translate into new
oligopolistic equilibria, with all outlets and ﬁrms endogenously reacting to the new mar-
ket structure. In particular, when the prices charged at the various outlets are strategic
complements, an outlet increases its price in response to price rises by neighboring outlets.
Thus, a merger alters the incentives not only of nearby insiders, but also of outlets that are
close to such insiders, and, by iteration, of outlets that could seem, at ﬁrst glance, little
concerned by the merger. Indirect eﬀects make the treatment eﬀect methodology hard to
apply to merger evaluation and, in theory at least, call for developing structural methods
in retrospective studies. In practice, however, reduced-form methods remain ubiquitous,
perhaps because of weaker data requirements.2
The main purpose of this note is to propose a method to build treatment and control
groups in a systematic way. The method potentially applies to any market with spatial
competition (fast food restaurants, supermarkets, movie theaters, gasoline stations, etc.).
It is based on an accurate description of how a merger alters the ownership structure at
the local level, given the market geography. The constructed groups are indexed by two
parameters: a distance or radius, and an “iteration parameter” that expresses the idea that
a merger can aﬀect an outlet in a more or less direct way.
We apply the method to a parking merger in Paris. The empirical results highlight the
crucial role of the control group and suggest that the researcher should keep in mind that a
1Focarelli and Panetta (2003) examine the consolidation of the Italian banking sector during the 1990s,
highlighting the interplay between market power eﬀects and eﬃciency gains at various time horizons. Dafny
(2009) considers the wave of merger activity experienced by the general acute-care hospital industry in the
United States during the 1990s. She is concerned that merging and nonmerging hospitals might diﬀer
in unobserved ways, and designs an instrumental variable method to address the potential selection bias.
Borenstein (1990) and Kim and Singal (1993) show how airline mergers during 1985-1988 have caused
prices to rise for aﬀected routes (relative to unaﬀected ones). Hastings and Gilbert (2005) and Hortaçsu
and Syverson (2007) look at waves of vertical mergers in respectively the gasoline and cement industries.
2Structural methods are more commonly used to run ex ante simulations or counterfactual experiments,
with somewhat mixed results according to Peters (2006). Froeb, Tschantz, and Crooke (2003) describe the
data that would be required to estimate a structural model of parking merger. Thomadsen (2005) illustrates
indirect eﬀects by simulating the eﬀect of counterfactual mergers in the California fast food industry.
1merger alters the oligopolistic equilibrium as a whole, and thus should not restrict attention
to direct eﬀects when constructing treatment and control groups.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the methodology in a general
setting. The remainder of the note is devoted to an illustrative example. Section 3 presents
the merger and the data. Section 4 builds a number of control and treatment groups.
Section 5 presents and discusses the estimation results. Section 6 concludes.
2 The methodology
We consider a horizontal merger in an industry where ﬁrms compete locally through retail
outlets. First, we provide a systematic method to describe, in a qualitative manner, the
extent to which a given outlet is aﬀected by the merger. Next, we construct various groups
of outlets and explain how to use them in a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimation. Finally, we
sketch out a number of possible extensions and robustness checks.
For a given radius r, an outlet is said to be directly aﬀected by the merger, or “aﬀected
at order zero” if, prior to the merger, it was operated by one of the merging ﬁrms and
an outlet located within distance r was operated by the other party. We note L0(r) the
corresponding dummy variable: L0(r) equals one for outlet i if and only if that outlet had
a rival j within radius r prior to the merger and both outlets are operated by the new
entity after the merger. Prior to the merger, outlets i and j did not coordinate their pricing
strategy, unless some form of collusion prevailed; in contrast, the same ﬁrm –the merged
entity– operates the two outlets after the merger.
An outlet is said to be “aﬀected at order one” by the merger if a directly aﬀected parking
is located within distance r. We note L1(r) the corresponding dummy variable. An outlet
operated by a merging ﬁrm (an “insider outlet”) may be aﬀected at order one but not at
order zero. This may occur if a nearby, directly aﬀected outlet is operated by the same
merging party.
By iterating the process, we construct a sequence of dummy variables Lk(r). An outlet
is directly aﬀected if and only if L0(r) = 1. An outlet has Lk+1(r) = 1 if and only if an
outlet with Lk(r) = 1 is located within distance r. By construction, the variable Lk(r)
is nondecreasing in k and in r. Since the number of outlets is ﬁnite, the sequence Lk(r)
converges as k tends to inﬁnity, and is actually constant beyond a ﬁnite iterative level k.
For any given value of r, we note L1(r) the limit and maximum value of Lk(r) as k grows:
L1(r) equals Lk(r) for large k. Finally, let N(r) be a dummy variable that equals one if
and only if an outlet has a neighbor within radius r (regardless of which ﬁrms operates that
neighboring outlet). We have:
L0(r)  L1(r)  L2(r)    L1(r)  N(r):
By construction, outlets with L1(r) = 1 have a neighbor within radius r, which explains
the last inequality. That inequality may be strict, as many outlets can be close together in
an area where the merging parties have no outlets or only one party is present.
If one believes that outlets less than r meters apart compete in price, outlets with
L0(r) = 1 are certainly aﬀected. Under strategic complementarity, an outlet increases
its price in response to price rises by neighboring outlets. Hence, nearby outlets, with
L1(r) = 1, may follow price rises by directly aﬀected outlets. Thus, the oligopolistic
2equilibrium as a whole is altered, and any outlet with L1(r) = 1 may potentially be
aﬀected. On the other hand, assuming that competitive interactions cannot signiﬁcantly
aﬀect price behaviors beyond distance r, outlets with L1(r) = 0 are certainly not aﬀected
by the merger, even in an indirect way, and thus constitute a well-founded control group.
We assume that panel data are available. The researcher has price data at the outlet
level over time. The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimation proceeds by comparing the price
dynamics in a control group and in a treatment group. The identiﬁcation assumption is that
unobserved variables (e.g. cost or demand shocks) aﬀect prices similarly in both groups,
and thus that prices would have evolved similarly in both groups but for the merger (see
e.g. Wooldridge (2002)).
The baseline model contrasts the dynamics of prices in a group of outlets with the
evolution in the complementary group (all the other outlets in the sample). For a given
iterative order k and a given radius r, we estimate the following regression equation:
lnpit =  + i + t + Lk(r)  POSTt + "it: (1)
The regression includes ﬁxed eﬀects i for each outlet. Accordingly, the constant, dummy
variable Lk(r) is not included in the regression. The ﬁxed eﬀects capture all characteristics
of the outlets that do not vary over time. The variable POSTt is a time dummy that equals
one if the date is posterior to the merger.3 Thus, the parameter of interest, , compares
the price evolution of outlets that are aﬀected at order k for radius r with that of outlets
that are not aﬀected at this order. According to the above analysis, the baseline regression
with k < 1 may lead to underestimate the price eﬀect of the merger as outlets aﬀected at
orders higher than k might experience price rises following the merger because of indirect,
strategic eﬀects and should therefore be included in the treatment group rather than in the
control group. Hence, our preferred regression has k = 1. As a variant, one may want
to compare the control group L1(r) = 0 to treatment groups smaller than L1(r) = 1, for
instance the set of outlets aﬀected at some ﬁnite order.4
The baseline model relies on a partition of the set of all outlets into two complementary
subsets: the control group, Lk(r) = 0, and the treatment group, Lk(r) = 1. One may
want to use more sophisticated partitions, for instance by incrementally introducing the
variables Lk in the equation:5
lnpit =  + i + t +
h
0 L0 + 1 (L1   L0) + ::: + k (Lk   Lk 1)
i
 POSTt + "it: (2)
As in equation (1), the control group is constituted of outlets unaﬀected at order k. The co-
eﬃcient 1, for instance, estimates the eﬀect of being aﬀected at order one, but not at order
zero, relative to being unaﬀected at order k. As argued above, the control group L1(r) = 0
is well-founded, provided that there is no strategic interaction beyond distance r. The es-
timation of regression (2) with k = 1 allows to analyze the pattern of the sequence 0, 1,
:::, 1. Intuitively, we expect the sequence to be nonincreasing as the merger treatment
can be thought of as stronger for more directly aﬀected outlets. The pattern may be more
or less steep depending on the strength of the aforementioned strategic eﬀects. Absent
3Given the diﬃculty to date a merger, it is necessary to run a number of variants as regards the deﬁnition
of the POSTt variable.
4In the empirical application below, this variant is implemented in Table 4.
5For simplicity, the radius r is omitted in equation (2).
3any indirect eﬀect, only the coeﬃcient 0 should be positive and statistically diﬀerent from
zero: 0 > 0 and 1 =  = 1 = 0. When indirect eﬀects are present, and particularly
under strategic complementarity, one can expect other coeﬃcients than 0 to be positive.
The stronger the indirect eﬀects, the ﬂatter the pattern of the sequence of coeﬃcients.
The fundamental limitation of diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences methods is the identiﬁcation as-
sumption. There exists an inevitable tension between the two requirements the treatment
and control groups are supposed to meet: on the one hand, the two groups must be suﬃ-
ciently far apart for one group to be deemed aﬀected and the other to be deemed unaﬀected;
on the other hand, the two groups must be suﬃciently close together for being subject to
similar unobserved shocks. If one suspects that some unobserved variables could play dif-
ferently in diﬀerent geographic subareas, one can interact time and subarea dummies, and
check whether the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences coeﬃcient remains statistically signiﬁcant.6 The
magnitude of the coeﬃcient, however, is diﬃcult to interpret.
The above methodology extends straightforwardly to horizontal mergers involving more
than two ﬁrms, or to successive mergers. Apart from horizontal mergers, the method can
be adapted to any event that aﬀects a particular group of outlets. Consider for instance
a vertical merger whereby formerly independent retailers are acquired by an upstream
supplier. In contrast with the horizontal setting, the corresponding dummy variable L0
does not involve any distance: an outlet is directly aﬀected if and only if it is involved in
the vertical merger. Another diﬀerence with the horizontal setting is that an outlet with
L0 = 0 cannot be operated by a merging ﬁrm. For higher iterative levels, our construction
can be implemented in the very same manner as above.
3 Merger and data
On 19th December 2000, the shareholders extraordinary meetings of Gtm and Vinci ap-
proved the takeover of the former by the latter. The Ministry of the Economy approved
the transaction on 22 June 2001 subject to a number of behavioral remedies. This has been
a large-scale merger involving many industries and markets. We use the method described
above to assess its eﬀect in one particular industry and one particular geographic area.
The merging ﬁrms were conglomerates with activities in building and civil engineering,
road construction, and concessions like turnpikes, underground parking lots, etc. As regards
the parking industry, the merger gave rise to Vinci Park, by far the leading car park
operator in France, with activities in 144 towns. The sole remedy imposed in this industry
has consisted of restricting the merged entity’s right to bid for long-term concessions of
city-owned parking lots.
We investigate the eﬀect of the merger in the Parisian parking industry. At the time of
the merger, 214 lots were oﬀering hourly parking in Paris. We know their exact location,
as well as the identity of the companies that operated each of them before and after the
merger. Except for Vinci and Gtm, parking lot operators have not changed between 2000
and 2001. As is common in merger retrospectives (see Hastings (2010) and Taylor, Kreisle,
and Zimmerman (2010)), prices are available only for a sample of outlets. Our price sample
consists of the 85 city-owned lots with hourly rates.7
6Wooldridge (2002), p.129: “In some cases we interact some explanatory variables with time dummies
to allow partial eﬀects to change over time. This procedure can be very useful for policy analysis”.
7Hourly prices of city-owned lots have been provided by the City of Paris. Qualitative information for
4As Table 1 shows, the pre-merger market shares of the merging parties were 35% and
20% in terms of parking capacity (fourth column). The merged entity operated 42% of
the 214 parking lots and 55% of the total capacity. The third largest ﬁrm, Saemes, was
more than ﬁve time smaller. Moreover, other competitors were quite small, often operating
a single lot. Based on capacity, the Herﬁndahl-Hirschman-Index increased from 1,714 to
2,975 following the merger.8 Such a move is well above the usual thresholds considered in
both the European and U.S. horizontal merger guidelines.
The last two columns of Table 1 report the average hourly price per ﬁrm. During the
sample period, parking prices in Paris did not depend on the time in the day. Prices were
typically changed a couple of times each year. They were about 2e per hour at that time.
Between 2000 and 2001, they rose by almost 4% in the whole price sample. Prices in lots
operated by the acquirer ﬁrm, Vinci, rose by only 2%. Prices in lots operated by the target
ﬁrm, Gtm, rose by almost 4.7%.
Table 1: Pre-merger market structure and evolution of prices between 2000 and 2001
2000 2001
Operator Nb (%) Nb City-owned (%) Capacity (%) Av. capa. Av. price Av. price (p=p)
Vinci 62 (28.97%) 31 (36.9%) 39636 (35.18%) 639 1.99 2.03 (2.01%)
Gtm 27 (12.62%) 27 (32.14%) 22172 (19.68%) 821 1.93 2.02 (4.66%)
Saemes 19 (8.88%) 14 (16.67%) 10299 (9.14%) 542 1.89 1.97 (3.93%)
Sceta 8 (3.74%) 1 (1.19%) 2414 (2.14%) 302 2.13 2.26 (6.06%)
InterParking 7 (3.27%) 1 (1.19%) 3825 (3.4%) 546 2.13 2.2 (3.13%)
Park Heulin 4 (1.87%) 3 (3.57%) 3293 (2.92%) 823 2.19 2.24 (2.61%)
Redele 4 (1.87%) 0 1020 (0.91%) 255 . .
All 214 (100%) 85 (100%) 112662 (100%) 526 1.96 2.04 (3.96%)
Source: Mairie de Paris and Guide des parkings de Paris.
Except for Vinci and Gtm, parking lot operators have not changed between 2000 and 2001.
Firms operating less than 4 lots are not shown, explaining why the line “All” is not the sum of the above
lines. In 2001, the average hourly price of the formerly Gtm lots is 2.02 Euros.
4 Building control and treatment groups
Throughout the paper, the metric is based on the walking distance, which diﬀers from
both the distance as the crow ﬂies and the driving distance (due to one-way and pedestrian
streets). We collected the walking distances between any two lots using an online map
interface.9 Next, we computed the dummy variables Lk(r) and N(r) in the set of the
214 Parisian parking lots, for all possible iterative levels k and for various radiuses r.
Table 7 in appendix reports the number of lots aﬀected and unaﬀected at any order for
radiuses between 250m. and 1650m. From the ﬁrst column, we learn that only two lots are
directly aﬀected by the merger for a 250m. radius. In other words, only one Gtm lot and
one Vinci lot were less than 250m. apart. For r=1650m., 66 lots are directly aﬀected by
the merger; for an intermediate radius, r=900m., 36 lots are directly aﬀected.
Examining the table allows to check that Lk(r) is nondecreasing in k and r. For
r=250m., the sequence is constant from k = 1 onwards. Only ﬁve lots are aﬀected at
all the Parisian lots has been found in a practical guide for motorists, “Le guide des parkings de Paris”,
Com3000 edition.
8For each ﬁrm j, let Kj denote the total capacity of all the lots it operates. The HHIs pre- and post-
merger are computed as 10;000
P
j (Kj=K)
2, with K =
P
j Kj.
9As indicated above, there are 214 hourly parking lots in Paris. Thus the computation of distances
involved 22;791 = 214  213=2 pairs of lots.
5any order for such a small radius. For r=900m., convergence is reached for a higher iter-
ative level, namely k = 6. The vast majority of lots (176 among 214) are aﬀected at that
order. Note also that 28 lots have a neighbor within 900m., but are unaﬀected at any order
for that distance.10 Only 10 lots have no neighbor within 900m.
Table 8 reports the number of city-owned lots aﬀected and unaﬀected at any order. We
insist that the dummy variables Lk(r) and N(r) are the same as above: they are computed
in the whole set of lots that oﬀer hourly prices. The only diﬀerence with Table 7 is that the
numbers of zero values and one values of the dummy variables are counted for city-owned
lots only. Comparing the two tables allows to check whether the explanatory variables Lk(r)
are distributed similarly in the whole set of hourly parking lots and in the price sample.
When reading the estimation results, it will prove useful to refer to Table 8, as regressions
are run for city-owned lots only. Due to the intersection with the price sample, convergence
of the sequence Lk(r) is reached for a lower iterative level k in Table 8 than in Table 7. For
instance, for r=900m., convergence is reached for k = 4 in the price sample and for k = 6
in the whole set of hourly parking lots.
Figures 1, 2 and 3 present on a Paris map the lots aﬀected and unaﬀected at order k,
respectively for k = 0, k = 1 and k = 1. The maps illustrate the tension suggested above.
Aﬀected lots, by deﬁnition, tend to be located in the same areas, in particular in the vicinity
of the Champs-Elysees (8th and 16th arrondissement).
5 The price eﬀect of the merger
In this section, we implement the method described in Section 2, based on the variables
Lk(r). For the sake of comparison, we also run diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimations using
preexisting market areas, as is common in the merger analysis literature. In the former case,
one looks at each outlet, wondering whether it is aﬀected by the merger at a given order
for a given radius. In the latter case, one examines the market structure of administrative
districts that form an exogenous partition of the market.
In all the presented regressions, the dependent variable is the logarithm of hourly prices
of city-owned lots for each quarter in the period 2000-2001. Although the merger has been
formally authorized in July 2001, the regulatory approval had largely been anticipated by
the operators.11 In the estimation results presented below, two quarters around the merger
date are removed from the sample period; doing so aﬀects the results very little. As ex-
plained above, we control for parking lot heterogeneity through ﬁxed eﬀects. All regressions
contain quarterly dummies. We cluster standard errors by parking lots to account for any
temporal correlation in unobservables.12
5.1 Using aﬀected lots at any order
We start with the baseline regression (1), comparing lots that are aﬀected at a given order
with lots that are not. Next, we investigate more closely the role of the iterative level, for
a given radius. Then, we examine the role of the radius. Finally, we include time-varying,
local dummies to account for possible local shocks.
10Formally, we have: L
1(900) < N(900) for these 28 lots.
11The merger under study is a friendly takeover. The public exchange oﬀer has been opened in July 2000
and closed in October 2000.
12See Bertrand, Duﬂo, and Mullainathan (2004).
6Table 2 reports the estimation results for the baseline model. Results are presented for
a 900m. radius13 and for all possible iterative levels k. As Table 8 shows, the sequence of
variables Lk(900) is constant in the price sample from k = 4 onwards, implying L4(900) =
L1(900) for city-owned lots. Accordingly, we investigate iterative orders zero to four. In
the ﬁrst column (k = 0), we compare price variations following the merger for the directly
aﬀected lots and for all the other lots. The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences coeﬃcient is weak and
statistically insigniﬁcant, even at the 10 percent level. As explained in Section 2, this may
be due to the fact that the control group contains lots aﬀected at positive orders, which
may therefore have experienced price rises following the merger. For iterative orders one
and two, hourly prices increase by about 2% in the treatment group relative to the control
group, but the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences coeﬃcient is either insigniﬁcant or signiﬁcant only
at the 10 percent level. Again, this might be due to lots aﬀected at higher order being
included in the control group while they should belong to the treatment group. Finally, for
iterative orders three and four, estimates are close as only three lots have a diﬀerent status
for k = 3 and k = 4 (see Table 8). We ﬁnd that the hourly prices of aﬀected lots have risen
by 3.4% relative to lots unaﬀected at any order.
In contrast, using the lots with at least one neighbor within 900m. (regardless of that
neighbor’s operator) as treatment group and the lots with no neighbor within this radius as
control group yields a lower, statistically insigniﬁcant estimated price eﬀect (sixth column).
Table 2: Comparing lots that are aﬀected at order k with lots
that are not (r=900m.)
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
L0  POSTt 0.004
(0.01)
L1  POSTt 0.022y
(0.01)
L2  POSTt 0.023
(0.01)
L3  POSTt 0.033*
(0.01)
L1  POSTt 0.034*
(0.02)
N  POSTt 0.025
(0.03)
Intercept 0.719** 0.709** 0.657** 0.657** 0.657** 0.657**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
R2 0.349 0.365 0.365 0.375 0.373 0.354
Number of obs. 510 510 510 510 510 510
Source: Mairie de Paris and Guide des parkings de Paris.
Dependent variable: Logarithm of hourly prices. All quarters of 2000 and 2001
but Q4-2000 and Q1-2001. Parking lot ﬁxed eﬀects and quarterly dummies are
not shown. Standard errors are clustered by parking lots.
y,  ,  Signiﬁcant at the ten, ﬁve, one percent levels.
We report in Table 3 the estimation results for equation (2) with a 900m. radius. The
ﬁrst column is the same as that of Table 2. The prices of the directly aﬀected lots do
not evolve diﬀerently from those of all the other lots. The second column takes as control
group the set of lots that are unaﬀected at order one. Relative to this control group, prices
13As we shall see shortly, the 900m. radius lies in the middle of a range of distance values for which
estimated eﬀects are statistically signiﬁcant and of the same order of magnitude.
7seem to increase more for lots aﬀected at order one but not at order zero than for directly
aﬀected lots, which would go against intuition. In fact, the corresponding coeﬃcients, .014
and .032, are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent (the p-value from the two-tailed comparison test is
28%). Moreover, as the p-value from the one-tailed test is 14%, we cannot reject, even at
the 10 percent level, the assumption that, in accordance with intuition, prices have risen
more for directly aﬀected lots than for lots aﬀected only at order one. The same observation
holds when the control group is Lk(900) = 0, k = 2;3;4 (columns III to V of Table 3).
Furthermore, for each of the presented models, we cannot reject the assumption that all
the coeﬃcients are equal.14 The results shown in the fourth and ﬁfth columns suggest that
aﬀected lots, irrespective of their iteration levels, have experienced price rises of about 3%
relative to lots unaﬀected at any order. In other words, in the particular merger under
study, the pattern of coeﬃcients 0, 1, :::, 1 turns out to be ﬂat, suggesting strong
indirect, strategic eﬀects (see the discussion in Section 2).
As already seen in Table 2, lots with a neighbor within 900m. and lots with no neighbor
within this radius do not experience statistically diﬀerent price changes. The sixth column
of Table 3 allows to understand this observation better, showing that lots unaﬀected at
any order do not behave diﬀerently from lots with no neighbor at all (the coeﬃcient -.005
in column VI is insigniﬁcant). Speciﬁcally, 11 parking lots among the 85 lots in the price
sample have at least one neighbor within 900m. while being unaﬀected at any order (see
Table 8). According to the analysis of Section 2, these lots should be included in the control
group rather than in the treatment group. Empirically, here, the price evolution of these
11 lots turns out to be not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from that of lots without any neighbor,
corroborating the view that the lots unaﬀected at any order (L1(r) = 0) constitute an
appropriate control group.
Table 3: Incrementally increasing the iterative level (r=900m.)
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
L0  POSTt 0.004 0.014 0.019 0.028y 0.030y 0.027
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
(L1   L0)  POSTt 0.032y 0.036y 0.045* 0.047* 0.044
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
(L2   L1)  POSTt 0.013 0.022 0.024 0.021
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
(L3   L2)  POSTt 0.036 0.037 0.034
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
(L1   L3)  POSTt 0.012 0.008
(0.03) (0.04)
(N   L1)  POSTt -0.005
(0.03)
Intercept 0.719** 0.709** 0.704** 0.695** 0.693** 0.697**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03)
R2 0.349 0.370 0.373 0.383 0.384 0.384
Number of obs. 510 510 510 510 510 510
Source: Mairie de Paris and Guide des parkings de Paris.
Dependent variable: Logarithm of hourly prices. All quarters of 2000 and 2001 but
Q4-2000 and Q1-2001. Parking lot ﬁxed eﬀects and quarterly dummies are not shown.
Standard errors are clustered by parking lots.
y,  ,  Signiﬁcant at the ten, ﬁve, one percent levels.
14For instance, in column V of Table 3, the p-value when testing the assumption that the ﬁve coeﬃcients
are equal is 65%.
8Next, we investigate the role of the radius, running regressions for a range of radius
values and diﬀerent treatment groups. Each cell in Table 4 correspond to a diﬀerent re-
gression. All the regressions use the lots unaﬀected at any order (L1(r) = 0) as control
group. The columns of the table correspond to diﬀerent radiuses, while the rows corre-
spond to diﬀerent treatment groups, namely the lots aﬀected at order k, k = 0;:::;3 and
k = 1. Thus, the ﬁrst line of the table compares directly aﬀected lots with lots that are
unaﬀected at any order, whereas the last line compares lots aﬀected at some order with lots
unaﬀected at any order. Hence, except in this last line, the control and treatment groups
do not include all the lots in the price sample. Table 4 reports the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
coeﬃcients, the standard errors, the coeﬃcients of determination R2, and the numbers of
observations, which vary across cells. The coeﬃcient of interest is signiﬁcant for radiuses
850m. and 900m. (as well as for r=950m. and k > 0, but only at the 10% level). In line
with the above results, Table 4 conﬁrms that, for such radiuses, hourly prices of aﬀected
lots (whatever the iteration level) have risen by about 3% relative to lots unaﬀected at any
order.
Table 4: The eﬀect of the radius
650m. 700m. 750m. 800m. 850m. 900m. 950m. 1000m.
L0  POSTt -0.012 -0.013 0.010 0.017 0.031y 0.030y 0.030 0.028
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
R2 0.306 0.314 0.276 0.285 0.306 0.317 0.327 0.316
N 282 276 252 264 246 246 234 228
L1  POSTt -0.004 -0.006 0.006 0.021 0.033* 0.036* 0.034y 0.034y
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
R2 0.319 0.330 0.339 0.357 0.372 0.396 0.404 0.407
N 438 420 378 378 366 384 366 372
L2  POSTt -0.005 -0.010 0.018 0.023 0.036* 0.034* 0.036y 0.034
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
R2 0.336 0.336 0.333 0.340 0.357 0.377 0.379 0.370
N 396 408 402 414 420 450 456 462
L3  POSTt -0.007 -0.012 0.012 0.018 0.036* 0.035* 0.032y 0.032
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
R2 0.342 0.342 0.330 0.350 0.372 0.377 0.366 0.366
N 426 450 480 504 492 492 498 486
L1  POSTt -0.011 -0.013 0.013 0.018 0.036* 0.034* 0.032y 0.031
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
R2 0.352 0.354 0.353 0.357 0.377 0.373 0.368 0.364
N 510 510 510 510 510 510 510 510
Source: Mairie de Paris and Guide des parkings de Paris.
Dependent variable: Logarithm of hourly prices. All quarters of 2000 and 2001
but Q4-2000 and Q1-2001. Parking lot ﬁxed eﬀects and quarterly dummies are
not shown. Standard errors are clustered by parking lots.
y,  ,  Signiﬁcant at the ten, ﬁve, one percent levels.
Finally, one may question the assumption that parking lots located in high-end ar-
rondissements of central-western Paris, e.g. 1st, 8th, and 16th arrondissements, are subject
to the same unobserved shocks as lots located in less valued districts, e.g. in the vicinity of
the Parisian ring road. One can wonder whether parking prices in so diﬀerent areas would
have evolved similarly but for the merger. This fundamental limitation of the diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerences approach can not be simply overcome. Yet, as a robustness check, we now
interact time and local dummies and include in the regression time-varying dummies for
9the ring road area, for inner Paris, and for each arrondissement:15
lnpit =  + i + t;inner + t;ring + t;arrond + Lk(r)  POSTt + "it: (3)
Rather than a single dummy variable for each quarter as in regression (1), equation (3)
includes a number of time dummies at the local level.16 The coeﬃcients reported in Table 5
are somewhat higher than those of the baseline model (Table 2). The magnitude of the
coeﬃcient, however, is diﬃcult to interpret as the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences variable interacts
with the time-varying local dummies in a complex manner. It is interesting, however, to
check that Tables 2 and 5 show a similar pattern. In particular, prices of directly aﬀected
lots do not behave diﬀerently when compared to all the other lots; the same is true for
prices of the lots with a neighbor within 900m. when compared to the lots with no neighbor
within this radius. The highest estimates are obtained for iterative orders k = 3 and k = 4.
Table 5: Interacting time and local dummies (r = 900m.)
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
L0  POSTt -0.006
(0.02)
(L1   L0)  POSTt 0.031
(0.02)
(L2   L1)  POSTt 0.035y
(0.02)
(L3   L2)  POSTt 0.069*
(0.03)
(L1   L3)  POSTt 0.057y
(0.03)
(N   L1)  POSTt 0.021
(0.03)
Intercept 0.677** 0.660** 0.655** 0.642** 0.652** 0.688**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
R2 0.523 0.534 0.538 0.567 0.548 0.525
Number of obs. 510 510 510 510 510 510
Source: Mairie de Paris and Guide des parkings de Paris.
Dependent variable: Logarithm of hourly prices. All quarters of 2000 and 2001 but
Q4-2000 and Q1-2001. Parking lot ﬁxed eﬀects and quarterly dummies at the ring
road and arrondissements levels are not shown. Standard errors are clustered by
parking lots.
y,  ,  Signiﬁcant at the ten, ﬁve, one percent levels.
5.2 Using preexisting market areas
A number of merger studies resort to preexisting markets areas. For instance, Focarelli and
Panetta (2003) use Italian provinces and Hortaçsu and Syverson (2007) use “component
economic areas” created by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Yet, as observed by Froeb,
Tschantz, and Crooke (2003), “market boundaries represent bright lines where there are only
shades of gray”. The method presented above can be adapted to use a preexisting partition
of the geographic market. We stress, however, that doing so entails serious limitations,
from both a practical and a methodological point of view.
Based on a given partition of the market area into subareas, we say that an outlet is
directly aﬀected by the merger if, prior to the merger, it was operated by a merging ﬁrm
15See Footnote 6 in Section 2.
16Some local time dummies must be dropped for identiﬁcation.
10and a lot located in the same subarea was operated by the other party. We note Q0 the
corresponding dummy variable. Next, we say that an outlet is aﬀected at order one by
the merger if a directly aﬀected outlet is located in the same subarea. We note Q1 the
corresponding dummy variable.17
On the methodological side, it is worthwhile noticing that the use of preexisting areas
does not allow to reach iterative levels higher than one. More speciﬁcally, suppose we say
that an outlet is aﬀected at the order two if an outlet aﬀected at order one is located in
the same district. Such a deﬁnition would be irrelevant as the outlets aﬀected at the orders
one and two would be exactly the same. It is thus impossible to deﬁne variables Qk, k  2,
in a similar way as we did above for variables Lk.
To illustrate the limitations of this approach in practice, we use two administrative
partitions of Paris to build the above deﬁned variables: the partition into the 20 Parisian
arrondissements and the partition into 80 administrative districts.18
The ﬁrst and second columns of Table 6 presents estimation results based on the ar-
rondissements. Among the 85 lots in the price sample, 40 are directly aﬀected and 53 are
aﬀected at the order one when the Parisian arrondissements are used. The diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerences estimation yield counterintuitive results. In particular, prices of lots aﬀected at
order one but not at order zero increase more rapidly than those of directly aﬀected lots
(the estimated coeﬃcients .007 and .075 are statistically diﬀerent).
The third and fourth columns of Table 6 are based on a partition of Paris into 80 ad-
ministrative districts.19 Under this partition, 24 parking lots are directly aﬀected and 28
lots are aﬀected at order one. Building the groups on a district basis yields no statistically
signiﬁcant diﬀerences in diﬀerences. This might be due to the relatively small number of
aﬀected lots.
Overall, the results based on the two preexisting partitions of the Parisian market appear
to be unreliable. The partitions have no economic relevance and do not allow to describe
accurately how the merger has altered the market structure locally.
17The variables Q
0  POSTt and (Q
1   Q
0)  POSTt correspond to the variables INMERGE and RIVAL
used by Focarelli and Panetta (2003).
18The total surface of Paris is 105km
2. The surfaces of the arrondissements range from 1km
2 to 8.5km
2.
On average, a district is about 1.3km
2, the surface of a circle of 645m. radius. In Table 6, the variables Q
0
and Q
1 are labeled A
0 and A1 when we use the partition into arrondissements and D
0 and D
1 when we
use the partition into districts.
19Among the 80 districts, 71 have at least one city-owned parking lot, 55 districts have at least two, and
50 districts had at least two distinct operators prior to the merger.
11Table 6: Using preexisting market areas (arrondisse-
ments and districts)
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
A0  POSTt -0.015 0.007
(0.01) (0.01)
(A1   A0)  POSTt 0.075**
(0.02)
D0  POSTt 0.004 0.005
(0.01) (0.01)
(D1   D0)  POSTt 0.022
(0.03)
Constant 0.727** 0.706** 0.719** 0.718**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
R2 0.356 0.439 0.349 0.351
Number of obs. 510 510 510 510
Source: Mairie de Paris and Guide des parkings de Paris.
Dependent variable: Logarithm of hourly prices. All quarters
of 2000 and 2001 but Q4-2000 and Q1-2001. Parking lot ﬁxed
eﬀects and quarterly dummies are not shown. Standard errors
are clustered by parking lots.
y,  ,  Signiﬁcant at the ten, ﬁve, one percent levels.
5.3 Discussing the eﬀect of the merger on parking prices in Paris
The results presented in Section 5.1 suggest that the Vinci/Gtm merger caused the hourly
prices of aﬀected lots to increase by about 3% relative to unaﬀected lots. Such a weak
eﬀect seems at odds with the large market share additions and HHI variations presented in
Section 3.
A couple of reasons may explain the apparent paradox. First, the capacity constraints of
the merging ﬁrms could attenuate the merger impact by more than the capacity constraints
of nonmerging ﬁrms amplify them, in accordance with Froeb, Tschantz, and Crooke (2003).
Second, and we think more importantly, the weak eﬀect could be explained by the spatial
distribution of the parking lots.
Since the merger involved many industries and many markets, the competition authori-
ties could not proceed to an in-depth analysis of the Parisian parking market. They argued
that relevant markets are generally monopolies in the parking industry as catchment areas
are small and consumers walking costs are high, implying that the merger was likely to have
little eﬀect on parking prices. In the particular case of the Parisian market, this assertion is
questionable. As Table 7 shows, 76 parking lots have a neighbor within 250m. and 144 lots
have a neighbor within 500m. What really matters is that the lots operated by Vinci and
Gtm tended to be located in distant areas. As regards the parking market in Paris, the
retrospective analysis is rather supportive of the decision to clear the merger, even though
the precise mechanism at stake had perhaps been overlooked at the time of the decision.
6 Conclusion
The methodology suggested in this note allows the practitioner to build control and treat-
ment groups with the purpose of assessing the price eﬀect of horizontal or vertical mergers.
The iterative construction is consistent with the fact that mergers alter oligopolistic equi-
libria in complex ways, and thus that seemingly distant entities (outlets, ﬁrms, markets
12areas) may be aﬀected through indirect channels. We argued that entities unaﬀected at
any iterative order constitute the most pertinent control group.
The method provides a systematic construction of the groups. It is simple and ready
to use, and requires less detailed data than structural approaches. On the other hand, it is
subject to the usual limitations of reduced-form methods.
As the above example has shown, relying on preexisting partitions constrains the con-
struction of the groups, thereby preventing the researcher from achieving robust results. In
contrast, our method is ﬂexible enough to run a large number of variants and robustness
checks.
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A Appendix
Table 7 reports the number of lots aﬀected and unaﬀected at any order for various radiuses.
Table 8 provides the same information for city-owned lots. See Section 4 for details.
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i
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t
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